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I. INTRODUCTION
Issues
This memorandum addresses two issues.1 First, is the ICTR decision in the Nahimana
“media case” regarding direct and public incitement to commit genocide reconcilable with
American law on free expression? Second, is the ICTR decision in the Nahimana “media case”
regarding persecution as a crime against humanity reconcilable with American law on free
expression? First, the memorandum presents a brief factual background on the ICTR Nahimana
decision. Next, the legal discussion section begins with a brief background about the First
Amendment and then moves into a discussion on incitement.

U.S. cases are reviewed to

determine whether the Nahimana decision is reconcilable with these principles.

This

methodology is repeated regarding the issue of persecution as a crime against humanity.

Summary of Conclusions
In regard to the Nahimana Chamber’s findings on direct and public incitement to commit
genocide, the breadth of the ICTR’s decision is probably reconcilable with U.S. law on the
freedom of expression. As illustrated below, there are a number of U.S. legal principles that are
related to the issue of incitement. The link between these principles is that each considers the
context in which the speech was made to be of the utmost importance.
However, in regard to the Chamber’s findings regarding persecution as a crime against
humanity, the breadth of the ICTR’s decision is probably not reconcilable with U.S. law on the
freedom of expression. Under U.S. law, unless speech falls within a specific, limited range of
speech aimed at potentially causing unlawful conduct or intimidation, speech that merely offends
the consciousness will not be prohibited.
1

Issue: “Can the breadth of the ICTR’s judgment in the Media case (Nahimana), as to Incitement to Commit
Genocide and Persecution as Crime against Humanity, be reconciled with American law as to free expression?”

6

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On December 3, 2003, the ICTR Chamber published its decision on the judgment and
sentence in the Nahimana “media case.”2
In its decision, the ICTR Chamber found Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco
Barayagwiza guilty of direct and public incitement to commit genocide, under Article 2(3)(c) of
the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda3 (hereinafter “the Statute”), for
their role in Radio Télévision Libres Millenes (hereinafter “RTLM”) programming which incited
violence against the Tutsi people.4 Nahimana, a former history professor, and Barayagwiza, a
lawyer, effectively controlled RTLM from its foundation through and after April 6, 1994.5
The Chamber also found Barayagwiza guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of direct and
public incitement to commit genocide, under Article 2(3)(c) of the Statute, for his personal
actions in leading the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (hereinafter “CDR”) and for
failing to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the acts of direct and public
incitement to commit genocide caused by other CDR members.6 “Barayagwiza was one of the
principle founders of CDR and played a leading role in its formation and development.”7

2

Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze, Judgment and Sentence, No. ICTR99-52 (Dec. 3, 2003) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

3
4
5

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
Id. at ¶¶ 1033-1034 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
Id. at ¶¶ 567-568 and ¶¶ 970-974 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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Id. at ¶ 1035; see also ¶ 719 (“[Barayagwiza] was present at and participated in demonstrations where CDR
demonstrators armed with cudgels chanted ‘Tubatsembatsembe’ or ‘lets’ exterminate them’, and the reference to
‘them’ was understood to mean the Tutsi. Barayagwiza himself said ‘tubatsembatsembe’ or ‘let’s exterminate them’
at CDR meetings.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
7

Id. at ¶ 276 and ¶¶ 975-977A [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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The Chamber also convicted Hassan Ngeze, as founder, owner and editor of the Kangura
newspaper, for direct and public incitement to commit genocide, under Article 2(3)(c) of the
Statute, for his role in using the publication to “instill hatred, promote fear, and incite genocide”
against the Tutsi people.8 “Ngeze was the owner, founder and editor of Kangura. He controlled
the publication and was responsible for its contents.”9
Ngeze was also convicted of direct and public incitement to commit genocide, under
Article 2(3)(c) of the Statute, for his personal role in calling for the extermination of the Tutsi
population by driving “around with a megaphone in his vehicle, mobilizing the Hutu population
to come to CDR meetings and spreading the message that the [Tutsi] would be exterminated.”10
In regard to the charges of persecution as a crime against humanity, the ICTR Chamber
found Nahimana and Barayagwiza guilty, under Article 3(h) of the Statute, for their
responsibility in RTLM broadcasts in 1994 that “advocate[ed] ethnic hatred or incit[ed] violence
against the Tutsi population.”11
The Chamber also found Barayagwiza guilty of persecution as a crime against humanity,
under Article 3(h) of the Statute, for his personal acts in leading the CDR that “advocated ethnic
hatred or incited violence against the Tutsi population,” as well as for having failed “to take
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the advocacy of ethic hatred or incitement of
violence against the Tutsi population by CDR members and Impuzamgambi.”12

8

Id. at ¶ 1038 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

9

Id. at ¶ 135 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

10

Id. at ¶ 1039; see also ¶ 277 (“The Chamber [found] that Ngeze was a founding member of CDR and active in the
party, and held the position of adviser to the party.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
11

Id. at ¶s 1081-1082 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

12

Id. at ¶ 1083 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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The Chamber found Ngeze guilty of persecution as a crime against humanity, under
Article 3(h) of the Statute, both for the publication of Kangura articles and editorials that
“advocated ethnic hatred or incited violence,” as well as for his own personal “acts that
advocated ethnic hatred or incited violence against the Tutsi population.”13

III. LEGAL DISCUSSION
Brief Background on U.S. Freedom of Expression Law
In relevant part, the First Amendment of the United States Constitution states that
“[c]ongress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”14 It is wellsettled that the freedom of speech and the freedom of press are well entrenched among the
fundamental liberties protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.15 This liberal
protection of free speech has arguably made the U.S. the strongest protector of free speech rights
in the world. However, in order to provide an accurate context for assessing whether the ICTR
Nahimana decision is reconcilable with U.S. freedom of expression law, two limitations should
be recognized at the outset. First, the freedom of expression is not absolute.16 In 1942, the
13

14

Id. at ¶ 1084 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
U.S. CONST. amend. I [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

15

Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (“[The] freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which are
protected by the First Amendment from infringement by Congress, are among the fundamental personal rights and
liberties which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action.”) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 19].

16

Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (“The First Amendment while prohibiting legislation against
free speech as such cannot have been, and obviously was not, intended to give immunity for every possible use of
language.) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15]; see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Although the rights of free speech…are fundamental, they are not in their
nature absolute.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 45]; American Communications Ass’n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394 (1950) (“[I]t has long been established that [First Amendment rights] themselves are
dependent upon the power of constitutional government to survive. If it is to survive it must have power to protect
itself against unlawful conduct, and under some circumstances, against incitements to commit unlawful acts.”)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6]; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951) (Douglass,
J., dissenting) (“The freedom to speak is not absolute; the teaching of methods of terror and other seditious conduct
should be beyond the pale [of Constitutional protection.]”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14];
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Supreme Court wrote that even “[a]llowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of
the [First Amendment] it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all
times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem.”17 Second, it is also well established that the freedom of expression
does not extend to protect violence.18 The U.S. government has the right to prohibit and punish
speech that fall within certain categories.

DIRECT AND PUBLIC INCITEMENT TO COMMIT GENOCIDE
Specifically in regard to the charges of direct and public incitement to commit genocide,
the Nahimana Chamber first considered the international jurisprudence.19 The Chamber noted
Defendant Ngeze’s argument that the “United States law, as the most speech protective, should
be used as the standard to ensure the universal acceptance and legitimacy of the Tribunal’s
jurisprudence.”20 In response, the Chamber noted that the U.S. law had also accepted “the
fundamental principles set forth in international law and has recognized…that incitement to
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971) (“[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been thought to
give absolute protection to every individual to speaker whenever and wherever he pleases or to use any form of
address in any circumstances that he chooses.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11].
17

Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 9].

18

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) (“The First Amendment does not protect
violence.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22]; see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476,
484 (1993) (“[A] physical assault is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 44]; Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 628 (1984) (“[V]iolence …or other activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative
impact…are entitled to no constitutional protection.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 28];
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 75 (1971) (“Certainly violence has no sanctuary in the First Amendment, and the
use of weapons, gunpowder, and gasoline may not constitutionally masquerade under the guise of advocacy.”)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31].
19

Nahimana, No. ICTR-99-52 at ¶¶ 978-1009 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

20

Id. at ¶ 1010 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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violence…[is] among those forms of expression that fall outside the scope of freedom of speech
protection.”21 The Chamber then went on to mention examples of U.S. case law supporting its
contention.22 Finally, the Chamber discussed its previous jurisprudence on the issue before
applying the relevant legal principles to the defendants.23
Distinguishing the Advocacy of Ideas from the Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct
Under U.S. law, there has to be an attempt made to distinguish between the advocacy of
abstract ideas from the advocacy of unlawful conduct.

Throughout U.S. Supreme Court

decisions “there has recurred a distinction between the statement of an idea which may prompt
its hearers to take unlawful action, and advocacy that such action be taken.”24
In attempting to make this distinction, one problem that the Supreme Court has
recognized is that in some sense “[e]very idea is an incitement. The only difference between the
expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrow sense is the speaker’s enthusiasm for
the result.”25 Inherent in this distinction is the danger that “[e]loquence may set reason to fire.”26
Along these same lines, it should be recognized that, in the U.S., “the mere abstract teaching [] of

21

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

22

Id. In the footnotes to ¶ 1010, the Nahimana Chamber specifically discussed the U.S. cases of Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) and Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003). Brandenburg and Black are also
discussed in this memorandum infra.

23

Id. at ¶¶ 1011-15 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

24

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 545 (1951) (Frankfurter, concurring) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 14].

25

Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J. dissenting) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 17].

26

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
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the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as
preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.”27
In the Nahimana decision, the Chamber recognized this important distinction and made at
least two attempts at articulating the distinction between speech that advocates an idea and
speech that advocates or calls for violence. The Nahimana Chamber acknowledged that some of
the Kangura articles and RTLM broadcasts did “convey historical information, political analysis,
or advocacy of an ethnic consciousness regarding the inequitable distribution of privilege in
Rwanda.”28 The Chamber also explicitly stated that it was “critical to distinguish between the
discussion of ethnic consciousness and the promotion of ethnic hatred.”29
The Chamber further recognized that, while the impact of words may even be powerful
enough to move listeners to take action, a communication on the discussion of ethnic
consciousness, for example, would not constitute incitement because the “impact would be…the
reality conveyed by the words rather than the words themselves.”30 In the Chamber’s view,
publications and broadcasts that discussed ‘historical information, political analysis, or [] ethnic
consciousness’ was in fact the very type of speech that fell “squarely within the scope of speech
that is protected by the right to freedom of expression.”31
The distinction between the advocacy of ideas and the advocacy of unlawful conduct is
also evidenced where the Chamber “note[d] that not all of the writings published in
Kangura…constitute direct incitement” and cited the example of the Kangura published article A
27

28

Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-298 (1961) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
Nahimana, No. ICTR-99-52 at ¶ 1019 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

29

Id. at ¶ 1020 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

30

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

31

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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Cockroach Cannot Give Birth to a Butterfly.32 This article, published in Kangura No. 40 in
February 1993, portrayed the Tutsi as biologically inferior and distinct from the Hutu.33 It also
described the Tutsi as inherently malicious and wicked people with their primary “weapons [as]
women and money.”34 The Chamber described the article as one “brimming with ethnic hatred”
but which failed to call its Hutu “readers to take [violent] action against the Tutsi population.”35

The Clear and Present Danger Test for Incitement of Unlawful Conduct
The U.S. Supreme Court first articulated the test for incitement to commit unlawful
conduct in Schneck v. United States.36 There the Court stated: “The character of every act
depends upon the circumstances in which it is done…The most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does
not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of
force…The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.”37
The Supreme Court’s most recent analysis of the clear and present danger test for
incitement is Brandenburg v. Ohio.38 Brandenburg involved the conviction of a member of the
Ku Klux Klan under a state syndicalism statute for “advocating…violence, or unlawful means of
32

Id. at ¶ 1087 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

33

Id. at ¶ 179 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

34

Id. at ¶ 180 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

35

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

36

Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32].

37

Id. at 52 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32].

38

395 U.S. 444 (1969) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7].
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terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform and for voluntarily
assembling [to] advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.”39

Brandenburg’s speech,

riddled with racial slurs and derogatory statements mainly about blacks and Jews, was filmed
during a Klan rally with KKK members in robes and hoods with many carrying rifles.40
In Brandenburg, the U.S. Supreme Court formulated the current standard regarding
incitement in the United States: “the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action.”41 The Brandenburg Court eventually held that the state statute,
mentioned above, under which the defendant was convicted, was violated the First Amendment
and was unconstitutional because it “by its own words and as applied, purported to punish mere
advocacy…and failed to distinguish mere advocacy from incitement to imminent lawless
action.”42
Under Brandenburg, there are three requirements that must be fulfilled before speech will
be denied protection under the First Amendment. First, the speech or writing must be “directed

39

Id. at 444-445 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7]. The Klu Klux Klan (KKK) is a whitesupremacist, anti-Semetic, anti-Catholic, xenophobic organization and probably the best-known hate group in
America. It began as a social club in 1866 but changed soon after. They began by fighting the 19th Century U.S.
Reconstruction Movement and adamantly opposed the idea of allowing free blacks to participate in the political
process. In the early 20th Century, the KKK imposed a “a veritable reign of terror” through the Southern United
States employing tactics such as whipping, burning people at the stake, and murder. The Klan’s victims included
blacks and moderate white from the North and South. The KKK also used cross burnings as a sign of intimidation.
see Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003), infra, for a brief discussion on the history of the KKK and cross
burning.
40

Id. at 446-447 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

41

Id. at 447 (emphasis added) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

42

Id. at 449 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7].
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to” inciting violence or unlawful conduct.43 Second, there must be speech or writing that is
specifically aimed at actually producing ‘imminent lawless action.’44 Finally, it must be shown
that the speech or writing will make it more likely than not that ‘imminent lawless action’ will in
fact occur.45

In assessing whether free speech protection applies under the Brandenburg

standard, it is imperative to consider both “the content and context of the speech.”46
1) ‘Directed to’ inciting
The first requirement under the Brandenburg formulation is that the statement must be
‘directed to inciting or producing’ some unlawful act.47 This language references an intent
requirement and at the same time “reinforce[s] the constitutional line between mere advocacy
and immediate calls to action.”48
In determining the intent of the speech, the Nahimana Chamber considered primarily four
factors: 1) the accuracy of the statement; 2) the tone of the statement; 3) the context in which the
statement was made, and 4) the positioning of the media.49
First, in regard to the accuracy of the statement, the Chamber argued that if a statement
was true or was even “information[al] in nature,” while it might generate resentment or even “a
43

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

44

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

45

Id. at 449 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

46

Rodney A. Smolla, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §10:28 (1996) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 47].
47

Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

48

Smolla, supra note 46, at § 10:34 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 47].

49

Nahimana, No. ICTR-99-52 at ¶ 1022 and ¶ 1024 (“In the Chamber’s view, the accuracy of the statement is only
one factor to be considered in the determination of whether a statement is intended to provoke rather than to educate
those who receive it. The tone of the statement is as relevant to this determination as its content…The Chamber also
considers the context in which the statement is made to be important.” ¶1024: “The positioning of the media with
regard to the message indicates the real intent of the message…”). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 2].
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want to take action,” the impact would be the result of the information conveyed by the
statement rather than the statement itself.50 However, if the statement was false, “the inaccuracy
of the statement might then be an indicator that the intent of the statement was not to convey
information but rather to promote unfounded resentment and inflame ethnic tensions.”51 The
Chamber maintains that a general statement such as “the Tutsi ‘are the ones with all the money’”
would be distinct from a statement regarding Tutsi owning a particular percentage of the Taxis.52
Second, the Nahimana Chamber stated that the tone of the statement was equally
important to the determination of whether the intent of the statement was to educate or to
promote tension.53 The Chamber believed “[t]hat Nahimana was aware of the relevance of tone
to the culpability [as] evidenced by his reluctance to acknowledge the text of the broadcast, ‘they
are the ones who have all the money,’” but he himself would not have used that language but
“would have expressed the same reality in a different manner.54
Third, the Chamber considered “the context in which statements [were] made to be
important.”55 The Chamber maintained that “[a] statement of ethnic generalization provoking
resentment against members of that ethnicity would have a heightened impact in the context of a
genocidal environment. It would be more likely to lead to violence. At the same time the
environment would be an indicator that incitement to violence was the intent of the statement.”56
50

Id. at ¶ 1020 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

51

Id. at ¶ 1021 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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Id. at ¶ 1022 (“The tone of the statement is as relevant to this determination as is its content.”) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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Finally, for the Nahimana Chamber, it was the actual positioning of Kangura and RTLM
as advocates of violence which indicated the real intent of the defendant’s message.57 For the
Chamber, in situations where the media “disseminates views that constitute ethnic hatred and
calls to violence for informative or educational purposes, a clear distancing from these is
necessary to avoid conveying an endorsement of the message and in fact to convey a countermessage to ensure that no harm results from the broadcast. The positioning of the media with
regard to the message indicates the real intent of the message, and to some degree the real
message itself.”58 To the Chamber, because the Defendant’s failed to “distance themselves from
the message of ethnic hatred,” they were endorsing the advocacy of violence against the Tutsi.59
In the Nahimana decision, the Chamber took the view that the fact that genocide did
actually occur in Rwanda supported a finding of the requisite intent for incitement to commit
genocide.60 “Incitement is a crime regardless of whether [or not] it [actually] has the effect it
intends to have. In determining whether communications represent an intent to cause genocide
and thereby constitute incitement, the Chamber considers it significant that in fact genocide
[actually] occurred. That the media intended to have this effect is evidenced in part by the fact
that it did have this effect.”61

The ICTR Chamber’s rationale regarding the intent of the

Defendant’s use of Kangura and RTLM is probably consistent with the requisite intent element
as illustrated in Brandenburg.
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Id. at ¶ 1024 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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2) ‘Imminent lawless action’
The second requirement under the Brandenburg formulation is that the speech must be
directed to ‘imminent lawless action.’62 The imminence requirement aims to establish a link
between the speech and the resulting crime.63 This is the question of ‘proximity’ mentioned in
Schneck.64
In its decision, the Nahimana Chamber held that direct and public incitement to commit
genocide is an “inchoate crime which continues until the completion of the acts contemplated.”65
This holding is seemingly, on its face, inapposite to the Brandenburg imminence requirement.
Although the Nahimana Chamber does seem to make the distinction between the advocacy of
ideas and advocacy of violence, in the U.S. even the “mere advocacy of the use of force or
violence [by itself] does not remove speech from the protection of the First Amendment.”66
Stated another way, the advocacy of violence or use of force – absent the intent and likelihood to
produce ‘imminent lawless action’ – is considered protected speech under American freedom of
expression law.

Thus, the key to incitement under the Brandenburg formulation is the

imminence requirement. There are two main viewpoints on the imminence requirement.
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Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7].
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Ameer F. Gopalani, The International Standard of Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide: An
Obstacle to U.S. Ratification of the International Criminal Court Statute?, 32 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 87, 105 (2001).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 49].
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Schneck, 249 U.S. at 52 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
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Nahimana, No. ICTR-99-52 at ¶ 1017 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
22]; see also Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d, 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (in discussing the Supreme Court
decision in Brandenburg, the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that “such a right to advocate
lawlessness is, almost paradoxically, on of the ultimate safeguards of liberty. Even in a society of laws, one of the
most indispensable freedoms is that to express in the most impassioned terms the most passionate disagreement with
the laws themselves, the institutions of, and created by, law, and the individual officials with whom the laws and
institutions are entrusted. Without the freedom to criticize that which constrains, there is no freedom at all.”)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 27].
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One view suggests that speech that is about to cause injury will be protected unless it is
actually on the very brink of causing that specific injury.67

It is argued that because the

“imminence and likelihood requirements are the backbone of the Brandenburg standard…[the]
mere fear that at some future time speech may ripen into harm” would mean that there would be
virtually no right to the freedom of speech.68 There is U.S. case law to support this contention.
For example, in applying the Brandenburg standard, the U.S. Supreme Court in Hess v.
Indiana69 held that “words amounting to nothing more than the advocacy of illegal action at
some indefinite future time” was not enough to satisfy the Brandenburg imminence
requirement.70 Therefore, the First Amendment would potentially protect speech that explicitly
urges specific criminal action as long as the action is not imminent.71
Furthermore, under this view, that the imminence standard requires almost immediate
action, an opportunity for discussion between the alleged incitement speech and the conduct will
negate an incitement claim. It is argued that the danger of speech cannot be understood to be
clear and present “unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may [occur]
before there is opportunity for full discussion.”72 Under this approach, “[i]f there [is] time to

67

Smolla, supra note 46, § 10:30 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 47].
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Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 47].
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414 U.S. 105 (1973) (Vietnam war protestor conviction for disorderly conduct reversed where statement that
‘We’ll take the fucking street later,’ was not obscenity within the legal definition, nor could it be considered a
‘fighting word’ as the statement was “not addressed to any particular person or group.”) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 18].
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Id. at 109. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 18].
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Gopalani, supra note 63, at 108 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 48].
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Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 45].
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expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the process of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech not enforced silence.”73
The defense in the Nahimana case attempted to make this very argument by asserting that
Kangura publications and RTLM broadcasts were even-handed, as evidenced by Kangura’s
reprint of the Tutsi 19 Commandments with the Hutu Ten Commandments and through an
interview with an Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”) leader on RTLM.74
However, to the Nahimana Chamber, Kangura’s rejection of the 19 Commandments
(Tutsi) and its support of the Ten Commandments (Hutu) was apparent given the tone and
manner in which they were presented.75 The Chamber thought that the “clear intent” of the
publication of the 19 Commandments of the Tutsi was to spread fear amongst the Hutu about the
danger the Tutsis presented.76 Conversely, the Ten Commandments of the Hutu was published to
tell the Hutu how to protect themselves from that danger.77

Likewise, the scornful and

contemptuous manner and tone in which RTLM broadcast the interview with the RPF leader was
presented with “derogatory references to the tall, milk-drinking Tutsi.”78
In the Chamber’s opinion, Kangura and RTLM were far from open or neutral forums for
discussion on public issues. Indeed, to the Nahimana Chamber, Kangura and RTLM “had a
well-defined perspective for which they were well known.”79
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Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 45].
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Nahimana, No. ICTR-99-52 at ¶ 1023 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2]. Furthermore, it may also be important to recognize that
unlike the United States, which has a plethora of media outlets such as television, radio, newspapers, and the
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Notwithstanding the previous considerations, if the Brandenburg imminence strand
requires lawlessness occurring at some definite, immediate future time, the Nahimana
Chamber’s holding that direct and public incitement to commit genocide is an “inchoate crime
which continues until the completion of the acts contemplated”80 is probably inconsistent with
this aspect of the requirement.
A different view on the Brandenburg imminence requirement, however, suggests that the
term ‘imminence’ may not necessarily mean immediate. While “[i]mminence, a function of
time, refers to an event which threatens to happen momentarily, is about to happen, or at the
point of happening… [T]ime is a relative dimension and imminence is a relative term, and the
imminence of an event is related to its nature.”81 In other words, time and imminence must be
considered in the context of the surrounding situation. A time span of several days, weeks or
even months between the actual speech and the harm may still be enough to establish imminence
if placed in the appropriate context. This viewpoint is consistent with the idea in U.S. law that
“[t]he character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.”82 Because
imminence is a relative term and not an absolute term, it must always be evaluated in the
particular circumstances in which the speech exists.
In the U.S., a specific threat of murder, for example, may be considered imminent for a
longer duration of time than other crimes as evidenced by the fact that there is no time limit on
internet, Rwanda was, and currently is, a developing country which had, and still has, relatively few media outlets in
comparison. Therefore, there was little opportunity for discussions countering RTLM or Kangura’s powerful
messages of incitement and hatred. Gopalani, supra note 63, at 110. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 48].
80

Nahimana, No. ICTR-99-52 at ¶ 1017 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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People v. Rubin, 158 Cal. Rptr. 488, 493 (App. Div. 1979) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
24].
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Schneck, 249 U.S. at 52 (1919) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
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when it can be prosecuted.83 So it may be that as a general matter, “the more serious the crime
the greater its time span.”84

Arguably for particularly serious offenses such as murder,

defendants should not be allowed to escape liability simply because a relatively short time frame
passes between the speech and the crime.85
Under this more flexible and context-specific imminence requirement, the Chamber’s
findings, that incitement is an “inchoate crime which continues until the completion of the acts
contemplated,”86 may be consistent with U.S. law on the freedom of expression. In this sense,
for the particularly serious offense of direct and public incitement to commit genocide,
Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze should not be allowed to escape liability simply because a
few days, weeks, or months passed between the incitement and the actual genocide.
One Supreme Court Justice, Justice Holmes, has even suggested that in times of
emergency or war, the imminence standard is more flexible: “[The power of the United States
Constitution to punish speech] that produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent
danger that it will bring about [] certain substantive evils that the United States constitutionally
may seek to prevent…undoubtedly is greater in time of war than in time of peace because war
opens dangers that do not exist at other times.”87 Likewise, the Nahimana Chamber’s decision to
punish speech may be further justified, and reconciled with U.S. law, to the extent that Rwanda’s
‘genocidal environment’ produced dangers, such as the potential to incite, that did not exist at
83

Rubin, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 493 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
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Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
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Smolla, supra note 46, at § 10:35 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 47].
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Nahimana, No. ICTR-99-52, at ¶ 1017 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627-28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) () [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
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other times.88 Because this second imminence view encompasses the context, it is the most
flexible and under this standard the Nahimana Chamber’s decision is probably consistent with
the Brandenburg imminence requirement.
3) Likely to incite or produce ‘imminent lawless action’
The third requirement under the Brandenburg standard is that the speech must be “likely
to incite or produce [imminent lawless action].”89 This final issue is primarily concerned with
the probability of lawless action occurring, the question of ‘degree’ as mentioned in Schneck.90
As noted before this requirement is concerned with the probability that ‘imminent lawless action’
will occur. Although there is not much legal discourse on this requirement, at least one U.S.
court decision lends support to the proposition that it may be a reasonable inference that a
newspaper article or a radio broadcast of a threat may have greater, not lesser, significance to
actually incite imminent lawless action than one which is made in private. In People v. Rubin91,
the court stated that “serious reportage by respectable news media of a reward for murder tends
in some degree to give respectability to what otherwise would remain an underground
solicitation of limited credibility addressed to a limited audience, and thereby tends to increase
the risk and likelihood of violence.”92
Although there does not seem to be any evidence of the direct solicitation for genocide
through RTLM or Kangura, to the Nahimana Chamber, “statement[s] of ethnic generalization
88

However, it is important to understand that even under this more flexible imminence standard, the timeframe of
the Brandenburg imminence requirement extends but does not disappear altogether. Unlike incitement in the ICTR,
which will continue to the completion of the crime, the crime of incitement in the U.S. will not extend indefinitely to
the commission of the crime. The flexibility of the imminence standard, in the U.S., depends strongly upon the
specific factual circumstances and context in which the speech is given.
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Id. at 493.
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provoking resentment against” Tutsis had a “heightened impact in the context of a genocidal
environment.” This type of statement “would be more likely to lead to violence.”93 Arguably,
Kangura’s and RTLM’s publication and broadcasts gave rise to otherwise ‘underground’
happenings and help give credibility and increased the likelihood of violence against Tutsi.
Notwithstanding the previous considerations, given the Nahimana’s Chamber’s finding
of the requisite intent, the flexibility of the imminence requirement, and the likelihood of
producing violence, the Chamber’s decision in the Nahimana case would probably satisfy the
clear and present danger test and Brandenburg ‘incitement to lawless action’ standard.

‘True Threats’
The ICTR Chamber’s decision in Nahimana may also be reconcilable with the idea that
some of the Kangura publications and RTLM broadcasts were ‘true threats.’ In Nahimana, the
Chamber explicitly recognized that “[t]he names published [in Kangura] and broadcast [on
RTLM] were generally done so in the context of a threat that varied in explicitness.”94 The
Chamber also noted that although Kangura and RTLM published and broadcast some of the
names without an explicit call to action, the message was nevertheless the same and being named
would bring about tragic consequences.95 In addition to the incitement of ‘imminent lawless
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Nahimana, No. ICTR-99-52 at ¶ 1022 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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Nahimana, No. ICTR-99-52 at 1028 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2]; see also ¶ 206 (“The
list of 123 names…was published by Kangura with a call on its readers to take action. The message conveyed was
that the government, who had named these people, was incapable of protecting the population from the threat that
they represented. Readers were urged to organize self-defense, with the clear implication that they should take
action against those named, to save themselves from extermination. By generating fear, providing names, and
advocating this kind of pre-emptive strike, Kangura clearly intended to mobilize its readers against the individuals
named on the list. Witness AHA, who to some extent defended the publication of the list as an official one,
nevertheless acknowledged that it may have served those who participated in the massacres. [However,] no
evidence was introduced as to the fate of the 123 people named on the list.”); and ¶ 487
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action,’ the Supreme Court has recognized ‘true threats’ as an area of expression that is
unprotected by the First Amendment.96
“‘True threats’ encompass those statements “where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of the intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual
or group of individuals.”97 As illustrated below, the difficult part in determining what constitutes
a ‘true threat’ is distinguishing it from “an idle threat, political hyperbole, a jest, misconstrued
speech, allowable coercion, or legitimate political advocacy.”98
Supreme Court Cases
i. Watts v. United States99
In the same year that the court laid down the current standard for incitement of unlawful
conduct in Brandenburg, the Supreme Court also took up the issue of ‘true threats’ in Watts v.
United States.100 The Watts case involved a statement made by an eighteen-year-old AfricanAmerican student at a public rally on the steps of the Washington Monument in opposition to
Vietnam War. The defendant stated: “They always holler at us to get an education. And now I
have already received my draft classifications as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical
this Monday coming. I am not going. If they every make me carry a rifle the first man I want to
get in my sights is L.B.J. They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.”101 The crowd
96

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (“[T]hreats of violence are outside the [protection of the]
First Amendment.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
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Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL. 283, 294 (2001)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 50].
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laughed in response to this statement but the student was convicted for violating a federal statute
that made it a crime to “knowingly and willfully make a threat to take the life of or inflict bodily
harm upon the President of the United States.”102 The Supreme Court reversed, finding that
given the context at a public-political rally, the defendant’s statement was ‘political hyperbole’
or exaggeration and therefore failed to meet the level of a ‘true threat.’103
Like the distinction between the advocacy of abstract ideas and the advocacy of unlawful
conduct, discussed earlier, the Supreme Court initially stated that “what is a threat must [also] be
distinguished from what constitutes constitutionally protected speech.”104 The Supreme Court
stated that the speaker’s “only offense here was a kind of very crude offensive method of stating
a political opposition to the President” especially considering the “expressly conditional nature
of the statement” (‘if they ever make me carry a rifle’) “and the reaction of the listeners” (the
audience’s response in laughter).105
One commentator suggests that the Watts Court offered at least four factors that a court
should consider in a ‘true threats’ determination: (1) whether the speech constitutes political or
some other type of hyperbole; (2) the overall context in which the statement is made; (3) the
reaction of the listeners; and (4) whether the statement was conditional and if so, conditional on
an event that was unlikely to occur.106 However, unlike Brandenburg, the Court failed to lay out
an express rule on determining what constitutes a threat.
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Unlike the statements made in Watts, to the Nahimana Chamber, the statements broadcast
over RTLM and published Kangura were arguably more than the ‘kind of very crude offensive
method of stating a political opposition’ to either the specifically named individuals or to the
Tutsi people in general. In considering the overall context in which the RTLM broadcasts and
Kangura’s publications were made, the Nahimana Chamber noted that it was a “genocidal
environment.” Both Tutsi and Hutu were aware of RTLM and Kangura. As illustrated by the
Chamber’s decision, the reaction of the Tutsis or Hutu moderates was far from laughter. Those
individuals, Tutsi officials and civilians alike, who were targeted expressed fear while the Hutu
listeners felt a sense of anger and hostility against the Tutsi.
ii. Rogers v. United States107
Rogers v. United States involved the interpretation of a statute for threatening injury or
taking the life of the President of the United States.108 While the majority reversed on grounds
not reaching the merits of the case, in a concurring opinion one Supreme Court Justice, Justice
Marshall, cautioned that any overly broad construction of a ‘true threats’ determination contains
the “substantial risk of conviction for a merely crude or careless expression of political” opinion,
the exact type of expression that was upheld in Watts.109 In his view, an overly broad
interpretation of a ‘true threat’ could in itself be a threat to the “‘national commitment to the
107

422 U.S. 35 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 29].
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principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ that the First
Amendment is intended to protect.”110
iii. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware111
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware involved a civil suit brought by white storeowners
against the black community of Claiborne County and against the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) for the boycott of their stores. In giving a speech
to the black community in Claiborne, the speaker stated, something to the effect, that if anyone
in the black community broke the boycott by going into white stores he would “break [their]
damn neck.”112 In reversing the state supreme court, the U.S. Supreme Court held the speech
was protected and was not a ‘true threat.’113
Specifically, the Supreme Court took into consideration the fact that the speaker had not
had any previous association with violence in either “authorizing, ratifying, or directly
threatening acts of violence.”114 However, the Court’s language suggests that if the speaker’s
“language had been [subsequently] followed by acts of violence”115 there would at least be a
question to determine liability. Nevertheless, without any such acts, the statement was therefore
protected speech. Again, the Supreme Court recognized that as long as the speaker does not
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incite ‘imminent lawless action’ the speaker should be “free to stimulate his audience with
spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and action in a common cause.”116
The ICTR Nahimana decision is also distinguishable from the situation in Claiborne
Hardware. In Claiborne, the Supreme Court considered heavily the fact that the speaker had not
had a previous history of violence and no violence had occurred immediately after the speech.
However, in doing so the Supreme Court suggested that the issue probably would have been
decided differently if there was violence.

In the Nahimana decision, the Chamber placed

significant, and arguably accurate, weight on the fact that actual violence actually occurred
immediately or soon after the publications and broadcasts. (quote regarding intent)
iv. Virginia v. Black117
The Supreme Court’s most recent analysis of the ‘true threats’ analysis is Virginia v.
Black. This case involved the conviction of three individuals for violation of a Virginia state
statute prohibiting cross burning.118 In the U.S., cross burning is a well-known symbol of hate
“and when a cross burning used to intimidate, few if any messages are more powerful.”119 In
Virginia v. Black the Supreme Court while holding that the state statue was unconstitutional as
116
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applied because it punished petitioner Black’s speech, cross burning at a rally, the Court upheld
the statute to the extent that it punished the speech of the other two petitioners, cross burning on
a black neighbors lawn, where it is done to intimidate. In defining “[i]ntimidation in the
constitutionally proscribable sense,” the Court stated, “[it] is a type of true threat, where a
speaker directs a threat to a person or a group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in
fear of bodily harm or death.” Furthermore, there is no requirement that the speaker “actually
intent to carry out the threat. [But] rather, a prohibition on true threats ‘protects individual from
the fear of violence and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders,’ in addition to protecting people
‘from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”

Circuit Court of Appeals Cases
Many U.S. Court of Appeals have also dealt with the issue of ‘true threats.’120 However,
one circuit court case that has recently received a significant amount of attention in U.S. legal
discourse is the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of
Life Activists.121 The Planned Parenthood case involved a civil suit brought by four physicians
and two health centers who provided medical services to women (including abortions) against
the ACLA, an anti-abortion activist organization, that was allegedly making threats toward the
plaintiffs.122 In affirming the trial court’s finding of liability, the Planned Parenthood court held
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In Planned Parenthood there were primarily two types of threats at issue: 1) The ACLA circulated “GUILTY”
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previously identified on “WANTED” and “unWANTED” posters; 2) The ACLA posted a website called “the
Nuremburg Files” which listed the names, home and business addresses, and home and business telephone numbers
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that the ACLA’s actions constituted a ‘true threat’ and was not protected speech under the guise
of the First Amendment.
The Planned Parenthood court held that ‘the threat of force’ or violence is “a statement
which, in the entire context and under all the circumstances, a reasonable person would foresee
would be interpreted by those to whom the statement is communicated as a serious expression of
intent to inflict bodily harm upon that person.”123 The court further rejected the claim [] that
‘context’ means only the direct circumstances surrounding delivery of the threat, or evidence
sufficient to resolve ambiguity in the words of the statement. Rather, courts are required to
consider ‘all of the circumstances.’124
In the Planned Parenthood case, the Ninth Circuit found that a public threat that is made
about a specific individual or identified group in the same or similar way that has previously
resulted in the death of individuals in that group is just as serious as a privately communicated
threat.125 The Planned Parenthood court recognized that while the posters might have been
publicly distributed, they were personally targeted.
Like the Supreme Court’s analysis in Watts and Claiborne Hardware, an important factor
in the Ninth Circuit Court’s decision in the Planned Parenthood case was the reaction of the
of various physicians who performed abortions, crossing out the names of those physicians who had been murdered
with a black line and highlighting in gray those physicians who had been wounded.
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exists a significant variation as to whether the test should be analyzed from the perspective of the reasonable listener
or the reasonable speaker. For a thorough discussion on this issue see Rothman, supra note 109. However,
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doctors, who were the targeted individuals. Unlike the non-violent reactions among the black
community in Claiborne Hardware, the Planned Parenthood physicians began immediately
wearing bullet-proof vests and hiring body-guards, and sometimes stopped working altogether.
Threatening speech that is made in public does not mandate “heightened constitutional protection
because it is communicated publicly rather than privately.”126 Rather, threats are unprotected
speech by the First Amendment no matter how they are communicated.127
The Nahimana Chamber implicitly made the same rationale as the Planned Parenthood
court.

In its decision, the Nahimana Chamber specifically discussed the publishing and

broadcasting of individual names in Kangura and on RTLM.128 As in the Planned Parenthood
case, in the Nahimana case, specific individual Tutsis and Hutu moderates were identified and
their names publicly disseminated in Kangura publications and on RTLM broadcasts. As in
Planned Parenthood, the threats in Kangura and RTLM were also personally targeted.
The Chamber recognized that as media outlets Kangura and RTLM did have roles to play
in protecting democracy and in mobilizing people for self-defense whenever necessary.129 In the
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Nahimana, No. ICTR-99-52 at ¶ 1025; see also id. at ¶ 204 (“The Chamber accepts that some of the lists
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suspects and called on the government to prosecute them. Although they were apparently not people named on an
official list, a basis for naming them as suspects was articulated, namely that they had left the country shortly before
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Chamber’s opinion, what separated the defendant’s specific uses of RTLM and Kangura from
this legitimate purpose in these circumstances is that they consistently identified the Tutsi
population as the enemy.130 Instead of directing the threatening speech against people who were
definitely a danger to a legitimate purpose, Kangura publications and RTLM broadcasts targeted
the whole Tutsi population, civilian and otherwise.131 In addition, the fact that after April 6,
1994 Kangura was known as the ‘bell of death’ and RTLM was known as the ‘Radio Machete’
is certainly relevant and important in determining how Rwandans, specifically the targeted Tutsi
population, understood and took the threats.132
As the Nahimana Chamber noted (and as the Supreme Court also recognized) there is a
societal benefit to the publication of official information.133 In some situations this may include
the identification of public officials. But the broadcast or publication has to be for the purpose of
serving a legitimate public interest or benefit such as criticism or impeachment. While Kangura
and RTLM had a legitimate interest in the publication of names, they did not necessarily have
the right to publish or broadcast the names with the specific intent or knowledge that the
publication or broadcast would cause immediate injury or death to those people.

Conclusion

the RPF attack. Under these circumstances, the Chamber cannot equate a call for their prosecution with a call for
their persecution, as the letter is characterized in the Indictment.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 2].
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While the preceding discussion identifies at least three different possibilities for
reconciling U.S. freedom of expression law with the ICTR Nahimana “Media Case” decision –
the ‘Clear and Present Danger Test/Brandenburg standard, the ‘Aiding and Abetting’ of criminal
activity and the ‘True Threats’ analysis – they all share a common factor: each standard or test
emphasizes or requires that the determination is context-specific.134 The speech cannot be
134

One area of unprotected speech that was not addressed in this memorandum is the aiding and abetting of criminal
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incitement that has been addressed in U.S. courts. While incitement may be characterized as the advocacy or
support of unlawful conduct, aiding and abetting may be characterized as the assistance of unlawful conduct.
Smolla, supra note 46, at § 10:35 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 47]. Neither the First
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& Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (“[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to
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means of language, either spoken, written, or printed…Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional
guaranties of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws…deemed injurious to
society.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 16]; United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619, 623-624
(8th Cir. 1978) (in applying the Brandenburg “incitement to imminent lawless activity” standard the court found that
although the speech did not incite ‘imminent lawless activity’, it did go beyond mere advocacy.”) [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 38]; Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (App. Div. 1975) (“The
First Amendment does not sanction the infliction of physical injury merely because [it was] achieved by word,
rather than act.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 43]; United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549,
551-552 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Words alone may constitute a criminal offense, even if they spring from the anterior
motive to effect political or social change. Where an indictment is for counseling, the circumstances of the case
determine whether the First Amendment is applicable, either as a matter of law or as a defense to be considered by
the jury; and there will be some instances where speech is so close in time and substance to ultimate criminal
conduct that no free speech defense is appropriate…Counseling is but a variant of the crime of solicitation, and the
First Amendment is quite irrelevant if the intent of the actor and the objective meaning of the words used are so
close in time and purpose to a substantial evil as to become part of the ultimate crime itself. In those instances,
where speech becomes an integral part of the crime, a First Amendment defense is foreclosed even if the prosecution
rests on words alone.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 39]; United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d
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separated from the circumstances in which it takes place. In light of the preceding discussion on
incitement and threats, the breadth of the ICTR Chamber’s decision in the ICTR Nahimana
“media case” regarding direct and public incitement to commit genocide is probably reconcilable
with American law on free expression.

PERSECUTION AS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY
In its decision, regarding persecution as a crime against humanity, the Nahimana
Chamber initially recognized two distinctions from the crime of direct and public incitement to
commit genocide.

First, it recognized that “unlike the other crimes [against humanity]

enumerated in the Statute…persecution [as a crime against humanity] specifically require[d] a
finding of discriminatory intent on racial, political, or religious grounds.”135 The Nahimana
Chamber determined that persecution as a crime against humanity required “‘a gross or blatant
denial of a fundamental right reaching the same level of gravity’ as the other acts enumerated as
crimes against humanity under the Statute."136
In the Nahimana case, the Chamber was satisfied that the Defendant’s speech through
Kangura, RTLM and CDR, targeting the Tutsis population on the basis of their ethnicity and
targeting Hutu and Tutsi moderates on the basis of their politics, reached this level of gravity and
therefore constituted persecution under Article 3(h) of the Statute.137 In the Chamber’s opinion,
“hate speech [was] a discriminatory form of aggression that destroys the dignity of those in the
group under attack…[which] create[d] a lesser status not only in the eyes of the group members

aiding and abetting, frequently involve the use of speech…”) (internal quotes omitted) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 37].
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themselves but also in the eyes of others who perceive and treat them as less than human. The
denigration of persons on the basis of their ethnic identity or other group membership in and of
itself, as well as in its other consequences, can be irreversible harm.”138
Persecution as a crime against humanity is most analogous to hate speech in the U.S.
“’Hate speech’ is the generic term…embrac[ing] the use of speech in attacks based on race,
ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation or preference.”139 While many laws in the U.S. do
“prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or disability,”
these prohibitions have not generally applied to hate speech outside of the employment area.140
In distinguishing between the persecution and incitement as crimes against humanity, the
Nahimana Chamber noted that “unlike the crime of incitement, which [was] defined in terms of
intent, the crime of persecution [was] also defined in terms of impact.”141 In their opinion, since
it was the impact which was the actual harm itself there was no need for “a call to action in
communications that constitute persecution [nor a showing of a] link between persecution and
acts of violence.”142 As a comparative example, the Nahimana Chamber cited the Steicher
Nuremberg case where Julius Steicher was convicted of “persecution as a crime against
humanity for [his] anti-semitic writings that significantly predated the extermination of
Jews…[but] were understood to be like a poison that infected the minds of the German people
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and conditioned them to follow the lead of the National Socialists in persecuting the Jewish
people.”143
In the Chamber’s opinion, “the virulent writing of Kangura and the incendiary broadcasts
of RTLM functioned in the same way [as the anti-semetic writings in the Steicher case in]
conditioning the Hutu population and creating a climate of harm, as evidenced in part by the
extermination and genocide that followed.”144 And “[s]imilarly, the activities of the CDR, a
Hutu party that demonized the Tutsi population as the enemy, generated fear and hatred that
created the conditions for extermination and genocide in Rwanda.”145
In its decision, the Nahimana Chamber maintained that the “freedom of expression and
[the] freedom from discrimination [were] not incompatible principles of law.”146 The Chamber
further asserted that “hate speech [was] not protected speech under international law.”147 In
making this assertion the Chamber referred to two specific international treaties – The Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination.148

The Chamber stated that “governments had an obligation under the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to prohibit any advocacy of national, racial
or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. Similarly,
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the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination require[d] the
prohibition of propaganda activities that promote and incite racial discrimination.”149
In regards to the international treatises, mentioned above, the U.S. consistently objected
to such provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination and attached reservations and
provisions rejecting them to the extent they were inconsistent with U.S. freedom of expression
law during U.S. ratification.150
In addition to these treaties, the Chamber looked to the domestic laws of countries around
the world, including Rwanda, that banned the “advocacy of discriminatory hate, in recognition of
the danger it represents and the harm it causes.”151 Although the Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution states, in relevant part, that “[n]o State shall…deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”152 While the First Amendment is applicable to
U.S. citizens through the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has not interpreted
hate speech to be a per se violation of the ‘equal protection’ of the Fourteenth Amendment to be
free of verbal or written discrimination simply because it is offensive to the general society.
While it seemed clear to the Nahimana Chamber that “freedom of expression and
freedom from discrimination [were] not incompatible principles of law,”153 U.S. courts have had
a more difficult time reconciling these two competing principles. “If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
149

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

150

Gopalani, supra note 63, at 98. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 48].

151

Id. at ¶ 1075 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

152

U.S. CONST. amend XIV § 1 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4].

153

Id. at ¶ 1074. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

38

idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”154 In fact, a central
purpose in the freedom of expression “is to [actually] invite dispute.”155 U.S. courts have taken
the view that the First Amendment may “indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger.

Speech is often provocative and challenging.

It may strike at prejudices and

preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.”156
The Nahimana Chamber concluded that “hate speech that expresses ethnic and other
forms of discrimination violate[d] the norm of customary international law prohibiting
discrimination.”157 To the Nahimana Chamber, “the prohibition of advocacy of discrimination
and incitement to violence [was] increasingly important as the power of the media to harm [was]
increasingly acknowledged.”158
The Nahimana Chamber maintained that because it was previously “established that all
communications constituting direct and public incitement to genocide were made with genocidal
intent…the lesser intent requirement of persecution, the intent to discriminate, ha[d] been met
with regard to these communications.”159 The Chamber also found that because the defendant’s
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“communications were part of a widespread or systematic attack…these expressions of ethnic
hatred constitute the crime against humanity of persecution.”160
In a similar vein, the Nahimana Chamber also maintained that persecution as a crime
against humanity was a broader, more encompassing offense, than the crime of direct and public
incitement to commit genocide and as such it included the advocacy of other forms of ethnic
hatred.161 The Chamber cited to the examples of the Kangura articles, A Cockroach Cannot
Give Birth to a Butterfly and The Ten Commandments (of the Hutu) as speech which did not
constitute incitement, but did constitute persecution.162
U.S. Case Law
The U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent discussion of hate speech is R.A.V v. City of St.
Paul.163 R.A.V. involved the conviction of a defendant (R.A.V.) for burning a cross on a black
family’s lawn under a local city ordinance prohibiting the display of a symbol that “arouses
anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.”164 In
reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional
because it punished individuals on the basis of content. The Supreme Court stated that some
types of content-based discrimination are unconstitutional when they allow the prohibition of
speech when speakers “express views on disfavored subjects.”165 Most importantly, the Court
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stated that the “First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech or
even expressive conduct because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.

Content-based

regulations are presumptively invalid.”166
However, it is important to recognize that in R.A.V. the Supreme Court did not hold that
the First Amendment prohibited all forms of content-based discrimination…” The Supreme
Court recognized that in its other cases that there can be restriction of speech in certain areas (i.e.
incitement, ‘true threats,’ etc.) because these areas of speech are “regulated because of their
constitutionally proscribable content.”167
In a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case dealing with the issue of hate speech, Collins
v. Smith, the court stated that “[t]he First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”168
However, this is not to say that hate speech is protected in all situations. The U.S. government
can protect “targeted listeners from offensive speech, but only when the speaker intrudes on the
privacy of the home, or [where] a captive audience cannot practically avoid exposure.”169
It may be true that speech in a public forum may arouse a sense of anger or hatred among
the vast majority of a particular community, even the majority of a community. However, under
U.S. law this type of anger or hatred would not be sufficient to ban all types of hate speech or
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speech that discriminates or causes ethnic or racial tension.170 Instead, U.S. courts will look at
all of “contextual factors that are necessary to decide whether a particular [type of speech] is
intended to intimidate,”171 or whether it violates another area of proscribable speech like the
aiding and abetting of criminal activity or aimed at the incitement of ‘imminent lawless action.’

Conclusion
In light of the preceding discussion, the ICTR Chamber’s decision in the Nahimana
“media case,” regarding persecution as a crime against humanity, is probably not reconcilable
with American law on free expression.
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